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dartmouth.edu (A. Appari).E-service quality is crucial for differentiating e-commerce offers and gaining competitive advantage. E-
service quality risk is the risk that a firm’s e-service quality will drop, or improve, relative to competitors.
There is evidence that benchmark ratings of e-service quality that are published regularly by third-parties
can impact the market value of rated firms. Firms therefore continue investing in IT-related determinants
of e-service quality. However, they do so without knowing: (1) the cost or return associated with a unit
relative deterioration, or improvement in e-service quality ratings, and (2) how this cost or return may
vary across firms. To answer these questions, we adapt a well-established financial risk pricing approach
for the case of pricing a single idiosyncratic IT investment risk, where an event study is used to generate
the market data needed to price risk (Thompson 1985). We then apply the approach with Keynote’s bi-
annual e-service quality ratings for firms in six financial services sectors. We find that firms’ sensitivity to
e-service quality risk depends primarily on the sector to which they belong, and also on their size and
growth potential. Our results suggest a cap on the amount that different firms ought to spend to achieve
a unit improvement in relative e-service quality ratings. The risk pricing approach presented can be
applied for other important IT investment risks, and the risk pricing information it yields may open up
new ways to approach fundamental IT investment problems.
 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Announcements of e-service launch initiatives have been seen
to benefit the market value of the launching firms (Subramani
and Walden 2001, Geyskens et al. 2002, Cheng et al. 2007, Lin
et al. 2007). E-services involve the use of information technologies
(IT) via the Internet to enable, improve, enhance, transform or in-
vent a business process or system to complete tasks, solve prob-
lems, conduct transactions or create value for current or
potential customers (Sawhney and Zabin 2001, Wu et al. 2003).
Using e-services, firms can provide rapid customer response, im-
prove service quality, enhance operational efficiency, and reduce
costs.
E-service quality is a crucial determinant in differentiating
e-service offers and building a competitive advantage (Santos
2003, Rust and Miu 2006). E-service quality is determined by
IT-related factors, such as website security and functionality, and
by product and process factors, such as product variety and order
delivery timeliness (Collier and Bienstock 2006, Rowley 2006).
Superior e-service quality can improve customer satisfaction,ll rights reserved.
enaroch), ajit.appari@tuck.customer acquisition, and customer retention (Boulding et al.
1993, Ranaweera and Neely 2003, Lee and Lin 2005).
With the payoff from e-service quality, however, also comes
risk. E-service quality risk is the risk that the e-service quality of a
firm will change – deteriorate or improve – relative to that of com-
petitors. This definition recognizes that risk can be negative or po-
sitive, consistent with the way much finance research defines risk
as the possibility that things will deviate from expectations (Elton
and Gruber 1995).1 Companies can develop their own measures of
e-service quality, but many rely on third-party benchmark measures
such as those from Keynote, Bizrate, and ePublicEye. Keynote
(www.keynote.com), for example, uses its GomezPro Scorecard
(GPSC) to rate companies’ e-service quality based on how customers
assess those companies’ websites along IT-related determinants,
including: functionality, content availability, accuracy of online
transactions, ease of use, and security (Al-Hawari and Ward 2006).
Keynote’s benchmark ratings are published regularly for the top
20–30 companies in each of numerous business sectors (e.g., banking,1 This definition contrasts with the way much of the research on IT has defined risk
as a negative loss event having a probability of occurrence and a loss amount. Instead,
it follows a growing body of IT research that has been using the latter view, for
example, in the context of real options analysis (Benaroch and Kauffman 1999,
Benaroch and Appari 2010).
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ings showed superiority over competitors have used them to boost
their strategic position (e.g., Citigroup Inc 2004), and as a result, firms
whose ratings show inferiority feel pressured to invest in improving
their e-service quality (Carpenter 2005, Wright and Dawson 2004).
Unless specified otherwise, for brevity we will hereafter use the term
benchmark e-service quality ratings to refer to competitive benchmark
e-service quality ratings by a third-party.
The reality, however, is that most firms invest in controlling
e-service quality risk without knowing what level of investment
is ‘‘right’’ for each of them. That is, firms do not know the answers
to fundamental questions: What is a suitable approach for pricing
e-service quality risk? Can the approach inform the firms about the
economic cost, or return, associated with a relative deterioration,
or improvement, in the third-party benchmark ratings of their
e-service quality? And, is the answer to the last question different
for different companies, depending on their characteristics (e.g.,
size, growth potential, industry)?
This research seeks to answer these questions by presenting a
finance-based approach for pricing risk and applying it to the case
of e-service quality risk. Finance research prices risk in terms of
two parameters: the sensitivity of an asset to a particular risk,
and the risk premium measuring the extra return that the stock
investor community expects to earn on the asset per unit exposure
to that risk (Elton and Gruber 1995). By telling us the value that
stock investors associate with a unit change in exposure to a par-
ticular risk, these risk pricing parameters could suggest a limit
on the amount that a firm ought to spend to achieve that level of
improvement in exposure to that risk. The financial risk pricing ap-
proach used to estimate these parameters works as follows. It
starts with a linear multi-factor model linking the expected excess
return on assets to the behavior of multiple systematic (firm-
independent) risk factors,2 and then uses arbitrage pricing theory
to estimate the risk pricing parameters based on market data (Elton
and Gruber 1995).
We will adapt this risk pricing approach for our needs because it
makes some assumptions that may not apply in our context. The
adapted approach starts with a single-factor model that is condi-
tional on events reflecting the effect of a single idiosyncratic
(firm-specific) IT investment risk factor. Thompson (1985) shows
that such a conditional single-factor model captures the essence
of the event-study methodology, which isolates abnormal stock
returns reflecting the impact of unanticipated idiosyncratic
economic events on the market value of firms experiencing those
events. Here, the events of concern are the periodic publication
of third-party benchmark ratings of e-service quality that show
changes in firms’ relative standing. We use five years worth of data
of Keynote’s bi-annually published GomezPro e-service quality
ratings for firms in six financial services sectors (banking, mort-
gages, insurance, etc.). There is evidence that Keynote’s benchmark
ratings change the perception of stock market investors about
firms’ relative e-service quality and, in turn, about the firms’
market value (Chen and Hitt 2002, Kotha et al. 2004). The adapted
approach then uses arbitrage pricing theory to estimate the
risk pricing parameters based on abnormal returns that firms
experience as a result of changes in their relative e-service
quality.
This article makes a contribution to IT and marketing research
on e-service quality and firm value. It is the first to present an ap-
proach for measuring and pricing the risk associated with e-service
quality. This approach goes well beyond extant research that only2 Finance research distinguishes systematic (macro-economic) risks that are perva-
sive in the economy and affect all assets from idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risks that are
unique to individual firms. Investors can diversify their investments to reduced
idiosynchratic risks (Elton and Gruber 1995).links individual aspects of e-service quality to firms’ financial per-
formance (Barua et al. 2004, Anderson et al. 2004, Kotha et al. 2004,
Chen and Hitt 2002). Risk pricing information opens new ways to
think about the economics of a firm’s e-service quality falling be-
hind, or moving ahead, of the competition. In particular, it could
help firms determine how much they should be willing to invest
in improving their relative benchmark e-service quality ratings.
Our results indicate that firms in only certain financial services sec-
tors have a significant level of exposure to e-service quality risk as
measured by third-party benchmark ratings, and that level appears
to vary across sectors. Further, our results suggest that firm size
and growth potential also influence how investors react to relative
changes in firms’ e-service quality risk, albeit their influence is
notably lesser in magnitude. The latter means that firms within a
particular sector have only slightly different sensitivities to
e-service quality risk as measured by benchmark ratings, due to
their firm-specific characteristics.
This article makes a broader contribution to the literature on IT
investment and risk management. We believe that it is the first to
adapt and apply a well-established financial risk pricing approach
to idiosyncratic IT investment risk. Another adaptation of the ap-
proach has been presented and applied elsewhere for the case of
software development risks, a somewhat narrower application
(Benaroch and Appari 2010). The approach presented here permits
the pricing of a range of IT investment risks that are of prime con-
cern to organizations, including security risks, customer adoption
risks, and technology maturity risks. The significance of this contri-
bution is also in supporting the solution of fundamental IT invest-
ment problems, including the management of IT investment risk
and of IT investment portfolios.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 re-
views literature on e-service quality and its relation to IT invest-
ment and financial performance. Section 3 presents our adapted
risk pricing approach. Section 4 empirically applies the approach
in the financial services context. Section 5 concludes with a discus-
sion of the empirical results and the reasons behind them. It also
discusses the implications of our results for research and practice,
and the limitations of our work along with directions for future
research.2. Literature review
This section discusses the importance of e-service quality in e-
commerce, reviews research linking e-service quality to firm per-
formance, and outlines the role that third-party benchmark ratings
of e-service quality can play in measuring the risk and return on
investments in e-service quality. Fig. 1 depicts the relationships be-
tween key concepts underlying the next discussion.
2.1. E-commerce and e-service quality
IT and the Internet have expanded horizons for businesses, lar-
gely through the automation of service in e-commerce. A typical
example is banking and financial services. According to the
Association for Payment Clearing Services, the United Kingdom
payment association, online banking there increased by 174% from
6.2 million customers in 2001 to 17.0 million in 2006, and, more
broadly, the number of adults shopping online increased by 158%
in the same period.
The basis for competition in e-commerce has shifted towards
differentiation based on e-service quality (Rust and Miu 2006).
Early e-commerce businesses were focused on reducing service
costs and increasing efficiency. However, most companies realized
quickly that selling commodities online at low prices resulted in
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Fig. 1. E-service quality in context.
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tiation via the quality of services offered. E-service quality and ser-
vice quality in general are recognized to be a crucial determinant in
differentiating service offers and building competitive advantage
(Santos 2003, Bauer et al. 2005).
One stream of e-service research is concentrated on customer
adoption issues (Wu et al. 2003). The bulk of this stream has
looked at the determinants of e-service quality and their mea-
surement. Many researchers consider e-service quality to be
determined primarily by IT-related factors, including website
ease of use, design, security and privacy, functionality, and infor-
mation accuracy (Devaraj et al. 2002, Al-Hawari and Ward 2006,
Yoo and Donthu 2001, Zeithaml et al. 2002, Rowley 2006). Some
add product and process-related factors, such as product variety
and order condition and accuracy on delivery (Collier and
Bienstock 2006, Lee and Lin 2005, Rowley 2006). Another part
of this research stream has examined how e-service quality
relates to higher level business-type measures such as the cus-
tomer web experience and behavior (Parasuraman et al. 2005,
Wolfinbarger and Gilly 2003), customer satisfaction (Bai et al.
2008), intention to buy (Bai et al. 2008), switching costs and
customer retention (Chen and Hitt 2002), and customer loyalty
(Al-Hawari and Ward 2006).
2.2. Investments in e-service quality and firm performance
Another stream of e-service research has also linked the above
measures of e-service quality with firms’ financial performance.
It seeks to confirm an obvious relationship that has been argued
to exist among service quality, costs and financial performance
(Zeithaml et al. 1996, Ranaweera and Neely 2003). Improved ser-
vice quality ensures long-term gains in profitability by increasing
the level of customer business (Reichheld and Kenny 1990) and
the ability of a firm to attract new customers and convert current
customers into repeat customers (Edvardsson et al. 2000). In the
banking context, for example, e-service quality was found to di-
rectly and positively affect bank financial performance (Santos
2003, Al-Hawari and Ward 2006). Observed impacts of improved
e-service quality in banking include the ability to attract more
profitable, loyal and committed consumers compared with tradi-
tional banking consumers (Fox 2005) as well as the ability to cut
costs sharply (Zhu and Chen 2002). Both impacts suggest that
the quality of e-banking services contributes to improved firm
profitability (Moutinho and Smith 2000).With payoffs, however, also come pressures to keep investing in
improved e-service quality. For example, if banking e-service qual-
ity were to become standardized and undifferentiated among all
competitors, it will be easy for customers to compare and switch
from one bank to another (Evans and Wurster 1997). Companies
need to continuously work at maintaining and enhancing their
e-service quality relative to their competitors though, since this
will discourage their customers from switching to competitors
(Anderson and Srinivasan 2003). Moreover, in some sectors this
need is further driven by pressure to offer customers emerging
IT-based e-service options such as those facilitated by mass social
media and Web 2.0 tools (Brechbühl 2007). As customer expecta-
tions continue to rise, no company can rest on its laurels for long
in offering the highest perceived value to customers. In sum, failure
to keep up in this ‘‘race’’ for improved e-service quality could ex-
pose a company to the risk of falling behind in its financial
performance.
In this light, firms are becoming sensitive to the economics of
e-service quality. Some observers argue that firms are eager to gauge
the value created through e-service quality initiatives (Geyskens
et al. 2002). Others argue that the offering of high and standard
e-service quality should be managed to enhance overall financial
performance (Al-Hawari 2006), relative to the risk and return asso-
ciated with investment (or lack thereof) in e-service quality. This
would enable firms to know how an improvement or deterioration
in their relative e-service quality impacts their market value, and,
whether the impact is equal for all firms in all sectors.
2.3. Third-party e-service quality ratings and firm performance
Some efforts have been made to answer such questions by
examining the impacts of regularly-published benchmark ratings
of firms’ e-service quality by a third-party. Examples of such rat-
ings are Keynote’s GomezPro Scorecard, Bizrate, ePublicEye, and
the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ASCI) on e-commerce.
Keynote’s GomezPro ratings, for instance, measure e-service qual-
ity based on IT- and website-related determinants, including: the
availability of information (content), accuracy of online transac-
tions, ease of use, provision of updated (timely) information,
attractiveness (aesthetics), and security (Al-Hawari and Ward
2006). Competitive benchmark ratings provide better-rated firms
with opportunities to capitalize on their prior investments in
e-service quality. Companies such as Citigroup and Huntington
Bank, for example, often issue press releases when their e-service
5 The exclusion of idiosyncratic risks does not mean that these risks have no
economic significance. Rather, when financial assets are priced from the perspective
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2007).3 At the same time, lower-rated firms have reason to feel pres-
sured to increase their investment in improved e-service quality
(Carpenter 2005, Wright and Dawson 2004).
In essence, regularly-published competitive benchmark ratings
change firms’ relative e-service quality standing, upward or down-
ward, and produce negative and positive economic events that
may result in abnormal stock market return around the ratings’
publication dates. This reality is apparent from numerous studies
linking third-party ratings of various determinants of e-service
quality to firms’ financial performance. Specifically, it was found
that, when certain benchmark ratings of e-service quality show up-
ward or downward changes from one period to the next in the rel-
ative standing of individual publicly-traded firms, the market value
of those firms tends to change accordingly upward or downward
(Chen and Hitt 2002). For example, a strong correlation between
customers’ online buying experience, as proxied by Keynote’s
GomezPro ratings, and the firm’s long-term performance, as mea-
sured by Tobin’s q, have been shown for a cross-section of retail
industries (Kotha et al. 2004). Likewise, a 1% change in customer
satisfaction, as measured by the American Customer Satisfaction
Index (ACSI) for e-commerce,4 was shown to be correlated with a
1.016% change in shareholder value, as measured by Tobin’s q, based
on an examination of forty United States firms (Anderson et al.
2004).
In sum, this literature indicates that third-party benchmark
e-service quality ratings can help to measure, or gain insight into,
the return on investments in e-service quality. The rest of this arti-
cle builds on this realization by presenting a model for pricing
e-service quality risk as well as applying this model with data
about third-party benchmark ratings of e-service quality.
3. Risk pricing model
This section presents the financial risk pricing approach along
with its adaptation to the e-service quality context.
3.1. Multi-factor model
The financial risk pricing approach has been developed within
the framework of a linear multi-factor return-generating process
(Elton and Gruber 1995). This framework offers a systematic way
of describing how expected returns of assets (e.g., stocks, projects)
vary with the movement of their associated risk factors. Where a
risk variable j is an uncertain observable characteristic of an asset
or its contextual environment (e.g., inflation, technology maturity),
a risk factor j is defined as the deviation of the ex post value of risk
variable j from its ex ante expected value. For example, if the cus-
tomer adoption rate for a particular service is a risk variable that is
expected to be 20% but turns out to be 18%, the customer adoption3 A March 22, 2004 press release from Citigroup offers an excellent example
[underline added]: The Citi Cards website . . . has again scored the #1 position in the Q1
2004 Credit Card Scorecard published by Watchfire GomezPro, the benchmarking and
website assessment services business unit of Watchfire Corporation. This is the fifth
consecutive period the Citi Cards website has achieved the top spot. Watchfire GomezPro
ranks the top Internet credit card sites bi-annually. Citi Cards also received the highest
score in the Customer Confidence and Relationship Services categories. ‘‘The #1 Watchfire
GomezPro ranking in the Credit Card Scorecard is another manifestation of Citi’s
leadership role in financial services and on the Internet,’’ said Amy Radin, EVP of Citi Cards
e-Business.
4 The American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) (2009) for e-commerce
(www.theacsi.org), for example, reported in March 2009 that the online financial
services industry has plummeted 6.3–74% on the ACSI’s 100-point scale, and that the
individually-measured online brokerage firms also dropped in customer satisfaction.
TD Ameritrade suffered the biggest drop, diving 11–71%. Fidelity and Charles Schwab,
with scores of 80 and 78, maintained leadership positions even while suffering 5%
drops in satisfaction. E⁄Trade dropped 6–69%, for a last place index position.risk factor equals 2%. This conceptualization of a risk factor as the
deviation of an uncertain variable from its expectation is the norm
in financial research (Elton and Gruber 1995, Cochrane 2005).
Assuming J risk factors, the finance literature commonly starts
with the next return-generating process (RGP) specification as a
way to explain the prices of traded assets:
~ri  ri ¼ bi;1~f i;1 þ    þ bi;J~f i;J þ ei ði ¼ 1; . . . n; j ¼ 1; . . . JÞ ð1Þ
where ~f i;j is a stochastic mean-zero risk factor; bi,j is a factor sensitiv-
ity indicator measuring the degree of exposure of asset i to risk fac-
tor j; ~ri is the stochastic risk-adjusted return on asset i; ri is the
return expected if all factor sensitivities are zero; and ei is residual
risk having an expected value of zero. A central assumption of the
finance literature on pricing risk from the perspective of market
investors is that only systematic (macro-economic) risk factors matter
and command a premium return.5 As a result, this literature relies
on a version of the RGB specification in Eq. (1) which requires that
all assets should experience identical factor realization values, that
is, fi,j = fk,j "i, k (i, k = 1, . . ., n).6 We, however, rely on the original
specification of Eq. (1) because our interest is in pricing idiosyncratic
risk.
Because risk factors in the RGP specification in Eq. (1) do not
necessarily represent monetary values, risk pricing relies on an-
other relationship that is derived based on arbitrage pricing
theory:
ri ¼ k0 þ k1bi;1 þ    þ kJbi;J ð2Þ
where kj is a factor risk premium indicating how much extra return is
expected per unit exposure to risk factor j; and k0 is the return ex-
pected if all factor sensitivities are zero. Arbitrage pricing theory
rests on the concept of ‘‘no arbitrage opportunities’’ and the law
of one price.7 An arbitrage opportunity arises when investors can
earn riskless profits without making a net investment. The law of
one price states that, if two assets are equivalent in all economi-
cally-relevant aspects, they should have the same market price.
Arbitrageurs enforce this law: if they observe a violation of the
law, they will engage in arbitrage activity and in the process elimi-
nate the arbitrage opportunity. In an arbitrage-free economy, arbi-
trage pricing theory can be used to price assets relative to one
another based on their co-movement with risk factors.
3.2. Single-factor adaptation for an idiosyncratic risk
Most investments in e-service quality (and elsewhere) are non-
traded assets and are exposed mostly to idiosyncratic risk factors.
It is therefore necessary to adapt the financial risk pricing approachof investors, the argument is that idiosyncratic risks need not be considered because
investors can diversify them away. In particular, it actually is less costly for investors
to diversify idiosyncratic risks than for publicly-traded firms owning the risk. For
example, investors could do so by building an equally-weighted portfolio of twenty to
fifty tradable assets (Malkiel 1999, Tang 2004).
6 This RGP specification imposes other requirements, but these have no relevance
to the single-factor adaptation we present. These requirements are: (1) the factors are
independent of one another and of the residual term; and (2) the residual terms ei
across assets is independent, to accounts for all systematic risk factors affecting
assets.
7 Arbitrage pricing theory rests on several other standard assumptions, which
enable the use of market data for the estimation of risk parameters that are universal
to all investors (Dybvig and Ross 1985). These include the following. (1) Agents are
risk averse with a bounded utility function. (2) There is a risk-free rate for lending and
borrowing money (in which case it must be that k0 = rf). (3) There is no market
friction – no transaction costs, no taxes or no restrictions on trading). And (4) agents
hold homogenous expectations about the risk-adjusted return ri that risky assets pay
(i.e., they agree on the identity and number of factors important systematically in
pricing assets).
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risk factor.
Suppose a single risk factor causes some firm-specific (risk)
events known to be associated with changes in the market value
of the firms experiencing those events. These market value changes
can be isolated using event study analysis. This analysis empirically
quantifies the economic value impact of an event by examining
abnormal stock price movements around the event date (Campbell
et al. 1997, Binder 1998). It typically does so based on a market
model, such as the capital asset pricing model, which implies the
following RGP specification (Cochrane 2005):
~ri ¼ rf þ biðrm  rf Þ þ ~ui ð3Þ
Here ~ri is the stochastic risk-adjusted return on asset i; rf is the risk-
free rate of return; rm is the expected return on the market index; bi
is the sensitivity of returns on asset i to the market returns; and ~ui is
a mean zero, independent disturbance term for asset i. The term bi is
also called the amount of risk, and the term ðrm  rf Þ is called the
‘price of risk’. Based on the capital asset model, the expected return
on asset i is:
ri ¼ rf þ biðrm  rf Þ ð4Þ
Thompson (1985) shows that, conditional on the announcement of
an unanticipated economic event, the expectation of the distur-
bance term ~ui in Eq. (3) can be defined as the abnormal return effect
of the event announcement. So, where ~ui ¼ ~ri  ri, if the event
responsible for the abnormal return effect is associated with a par-
ticular firm-specific risk factor, ~f , we can write Eq. (1) as a single-
factor RGP specification that is conditional on the occurrence of this
event:
~ui ¼ b~f i þ ei ð1
0 Þ
This single-factor model follows Thompson’s (1985) logic that sug-
gests a conditional RGP specification can account for the effects of
specific idiosyncratic risk events. Thompson (1985) further shows
that the conditional RGP captures the essence of the event-study
problem, which is about estimating the parameters in the model
and testing hypotheses about their magnitudes and significance
levels. Hence, following the financial approach, the risk factor in
RGP specification Eq. (1
0
) can be priced using a standard application
of arbitrage pricing theory according to the single-factor
relationship:
ri ¼ rf þ kb ð2
0 Þ4. Model application to e-service quality





) to the pricing of e-service quality risk in the context of pub-
licly-traded financial services firms. We describe the data, the anal-
ysis approach used to estimate the respective risk parameters, and
the estimation results.
4.1. Data
For this study, what constitutes a risk event is not the mere
publication of a competitive benchmark rating for firm i at time
t, denoted Ri,t, but rather the unanticipated relative change in the
ratings from publication time t  1, defined as DRi,t = [Ri,t  Ri,t1]/
Ri,t1. An underlying assumption of this definition is that rated
firms invest at the same rate at their e-service quality, and there-
fore their relative e-service quality ratings are not expected to
change. The premise is that when some firms deviate from this
behavioral investment pattern and unanticipated changes in rela-
tive ratings do occur, they convey to investors important (positiveor negative) risk information about e-service quality. If this infor-
mation leads to noticeable stock price movements, those move-
ments could be isolated using an event study and used thereafter
to price e-service quality risk. It is important to add the possibility
that stock price movements may actually be in response to relative
changes in firms’ order-rankings rather than in firms’ scaled-
ratings. We have included this possibility in the coming analysis,
but we do not report the results because we found no statistical
evidence to that being the case.
The competitive benchmark rating data we use is Keynote’s
GomezPro Scorecard (GPSC) ratings of e-service quality for B2C
e-channels. GPSC ratings are well-accepted in practice (Carpenter
2005) and often-used in research (Chen and Hitt 2002, Kotha
et al. 2004). They pertain to the B2C websites of companies in
the retail and financial services sectors. They are developed based
on how customers evaluate IT-related determinants of e-service
quality pertaining to the following website dimensions: function-
ality, ease of use, privacy and security, and quality and availability
(see Fig. 1). These dimensions map well to multidimensional met-
rics that have been validated by prior academic research (Devaraj
et al. 2002). GPSC ratings are computed as a weighted average of
normalized values on a 1–10 scale, with the weights being 40%
for functionality, 35% for ease of use, 15% for privacy and security,
and 10% for quality and availability. GPSC benchmark ratings are
published bi-annually for all sectors (except for two sectors for
which they were published quarterly in 1999). The first set of
ratings was published in April 1999 for the discount brokerage
sector. Later ratings were published also for the banking,
full-service brokerage, insurance, mortgages, and credit card
services sectors.
We use five years worth of GPSC data, representing the period
from early 1999 to the end of 2004. After 2004 the GPSC rating lost
its third-party objectivity when the company producing them was
purchased by Keynote, a firm that also offers consulting services to
rated firms seeking to improve their e-service quality ratings, and
the rating methodology has been changed (Wright and Dawson
2004). There are a total of 64 GPSC publication dates made for
the six financial services sectors listed above. In total, 168 firms
across the six sectors were rated by GPSC, but we refined this list
based on the following criteria. First, firms not traded on the
New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ are excluded. Second, the
first inclusion of a firm in the GPSC ratings is deleted if that firm’s
stock was not traded at least sixty days prior to the respective
GPSC publication. Last, firms were deleted if the GPSC publication
date is confounded by other firm-specific major event (e.g., quar-
terly earnings announcements, merger and acquisition announce-
ments, stock splits). After applying these criteria the sample was
reduced to 102 firms, with a total of 809 usable (firm, published rat-
ing event date) pairs.
Table 1 offers summary statistics for the firms’ GPSC ratings in
our data. The ratings, Rt, fall between 3 and 8 (on a 1–10 scale),
with the mean around 5. The relative changes in GPSC ratings from
one period to the next, DRt, vary across sectors but their means are
close to zero for all sectors. Finally, the frequency of GPSC rating
upgrades (Rt > Rt1) and downgrades (Rt1 > Rt) from one period
to the next appear to be reasonably balanced.
Table 1 also offers descriptive statistics for the firms rated by
GPSC based on other data. These other data include daily stock re-
turns for individual firms and the risk-free rate, represented by the
30-day Treasury bill rate obtained from the CRSP database, and
financial firm data (e.g., total assets, book value) obtained from
the COMPUSTAT database. The firms rated by GPSC vary in size
and in their growth prospects, with a market-to-book value ratio
as low as 0.14 (low-growth prospects) and as high as 22.78
(high-growth prospects). These figures suggest that the GPSC
announcements we use pertain to a heterogonous set of firms.
Table 1
Descriptive statistic of GPSC ratings and the rated firms.
Sector
Banks Credit cards Discount brokerage Full-service brokerage Insurance Mortgages
No. announcements 12 11 14 9 8 10
GPSC rating (scale 1–10) Min. 3.21 3.29 3.25 4.10 2.68 3.12
Avg. 5.79 4.83 5.79 5.80 5.88 5.12
Max. 7.61 6.85 7.99 7.48 7.80 7.94
Std. dev. 0.837 0.734 0.961 0.833 1.011 1.062
Relative change in GPSC rating Min. 0.338 0.355 0.751 0.149 0.327 0.328
Avg. 0.024 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.004 0.037
Max. 0.477 0.279 2.732 0.22 0.202 0.8
Std. dev. 0.096 0.099 0.087 0.078 0.101 0.177
Distribution of Gomez score
upgrades and downgrades
Upgrade 135 64 90 25 31 48
Downgrade 84 83 117 29 27 31
No change 7 5 7 7 5 11
Total 226 155 214 61 63 90
No. firms 23 20 21 11 12 15
Total assets ($M) Min. 116 372 22 2381 168 35
Avg. 203,001 289,330 208,782 476,576 163,312 159,454
Max. 1436,554 1453,628 1457,933 1436,389 724,154 1317,591
Market-to-book value ratio Min. 0.762 0.225 0.211 0.846 0.891 0.396
Avg. 2.322 3.061 4.056 2.628 2.891 2.203
Max. 7.200 30.456 18.162 6.642 12.149 5.883
Table 2







Positive:negative Patell’s Z Generalized
sign Z
3 809 0.08 371:438 1.413 0.936
2 809 0.35 460:349 3.889*** 5.330***
1 809 0.44 428:381 3.184*** 3.077**
0 809 0.21 430:379 2.699** 3.218***
+1 809 0.20 458:351 3.435*** 5.189***
+2 809 0.16 402:407 3.005** 1.247
+3 809 0.03 382:427 0.108 0.161
[2, 0] 809 1.00 470:339 5.175*** 5.612***
[2, +1] 809 1.19 485:324 6.061*** 6.559***
[1, 0] 809 0.65 456:353 4.160*** 5.049***
[1, +1] 809 0.85 470:339 5.380*** 6.034***
** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tail test.
*** Statistical significance at the 0.001 level using a two-tail test.
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The impact of published GPSC ratings on the value of rated firms
can be established using an event study. The events of interest are
the unexpected relative changes in the GPSC ratings assigned to indi-
vidual firms. To estimate stock returns in the absence of these
events, daily stock returns are regressed against daily returns on
a composite market index based on the capital asset pricing model.
This is given by r̂i;t ¼ ai þ birm;t þ ei;t , where r̂i;t is the estimated
stock return on day t in excess of the risk-free rate rf,t; rm,t is the
daily return on the market portfolio in excess of rf,t; ai and bi are
firm-specific capital asset pricing model parameters; and ei,t is a
random error term for firm i on day t.8 The market model is esti-
mated for each (firm, event date) combination using 250 daily re-
turns, starting 253 trading days before the event date,9 with the
market portfolio being a weighted composite index formed by com-
bining stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. The abnormal return for a given firm
and announcement date is computed as the difference between the
observed returns and that predicted by the generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) market model (Chatterjee et al.
2002), as follows: ARi;t ¼ ri;t  r̂i;t .
We compute abnormal returns (ARs) starting three days before
an event (3) and ending three days past the event (+3), as well
as cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the various respective
event windows. The longest event window, denoted by [3, +3], al-
lows us to capture the impact of a change in e-service quality on8 Conventionally ei,t is assumed to be normally distributed. Yet, with research
which shows that the daily stock returns exhibit an autoregressive heteroscedastic
error pattern, failure to adjust for conditional heteroscedasticity may compromise the
quality of the statistical inferences (Corhay and Rad 1996). Indeed, for our sample
data, the market model’s residuals using the Lagrange multiplier approach give strong
evidence of ARCH errors in over 25% of the cases. We hence adjust the market model
for conditional heteroscedasticity by using a GARCH (p = 1, q = 1) model, where p is
the order of the autoregressive lag and q is the order of the moving average lag.
Empirical finance research on daily returns data has shown that the simple version of
GARCH (1, 1) is adequate to account for conditional variance and performs better than
any higher order of GARCH with p + q > 3 (Corhay and Rad 1996).
9 We also tried using 180 daily returns in order to avoid the possibility of overlap
between GPSC announcements (which occur bi-annually) and to perform a robust-
ness check. The results were not quantitatively or statistically different.investors’ perceptions of a firm’s value, because it can account
for leakage of information before an announcement and for a slow
market response to the announcement. We test the significance of
ARs and CARs using two-tailed tests of Patell’s Z-statistic and the
generalized sign Z-statistic (Cowan Research 2007).10 The latter
test adjusts for the normal asymmetric proportion of positive and
negative abnormal returns. Two-tailed tests are used since we hold
no expectation on the sign of ARs and the proportion of firms that
may be favored by relative changes in GPSC ratings.
Table 2 presents the univariate analysis results of mean ARs and
mean CARs. The results support the assertion that announcements
(publications) of GPSC ratings convey significant information to the
investor community regarding relative changes in e-service quality
of B2C channels of financial services firms. Considering the10 We saw no need to use the portfolio statistic instead (Brown and Warner 1985),
even though small subsets in the sample data exhibit the characteristics of clustered
events. The reason is that there are 64 GPSC announcements, where only the events
pertaining to a single GPSC announcement may potentially exhibit the characteristics
of clustered events.
Table 3
Estimation of Factor Sensitivities.
Variable Model-1 for estimating factor
sensitivities
Model-1.1 for robustness testing (adds two
firm-specific control variables)
Model-1.2 for robustness testing (contains
only the control variables)
Parameter estimate t-value Pr > |t| Parameter estimate t-value Pr > |t| Parameter estimate t-value Pr > |t|
Intercept 0.367 1.83* 0.0681 3.377 5.37*** <.0001 3.158 4.86*** <.0001
Sensitivities
b1 (banks) 5.442 0.89 0.3756 6.866 1.15 0.2484
b2 (brok. discount) 12.127 5.12*** <.0001 12.766 5.57*** <.0001
b3 (brok. full service) 1.806 0.10 0.9212 0.805 0.05 0.9637
b4 (credit cards) 20.929 4.66*** <.0001 24.374 5.58*** <.0001
b5 (insurance) 0.968 0.10 0.9203 4.767 0.51 0.6117
b6 (mortgages) 4.894 2.00** 0.0453 4.212 3.24*** 0.0012
Control variables
b7 (firm size; ln TA) 0.156 2.32** 0.0207 0.146 2.10** 0.0357
b8 (firm growth; ln MBV) 1.693 7.39*** <.0001 1.509 6.42*** <.0001
N 809 809 809
R2 0.062 0.124 0.051
Adj. R2 0.055 0.115 0.048
F-value 8.83*** 14.18*** 21.60***
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
* Significance at the 0.1 level (two-tailed).
** Significance at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
*** Significance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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sign Z test, the mean ARs are different than zero only between
day 2 and day +1. This indicates that the only days with signifi-
cant observed changes in firms’ market value are between day
2 and day +1. Table 2 shows the mean CARs only for the event
windows that are defined by these days. Based on both statistical
tests, all these mean CARs are different than zero at a high statisti-
cal significance level.
4.3. Estimation of risk pricing parameters
To price e-service quality risk, we ran two regressions. We first
estimated the firms’ sensitivities to e-service quality risk by
regressing a version of Eq. (1
0
) that is adapted to our data. The
dependent variable is CAR[2, 1], as the CAR for event window
[2, 1] best captures the impact of GPSC ratings among the various
event windows we considered (see Table 2). The independent var-
iable is the relative change in the GPSC rating from its expected va-
lue, DRt. If a firm is rated for the first time at publication time t, a
proxy rating for the immediate prior time is taken to be the median
rating of all firms rated in publication time t1.
Given that our data covers firms from six different financial ser-
vices sectors, we assume that firms in one sector have similar sen-
sitivities to relative changes in their benchmark e-service quality
ratings. This means that we need to run for each sector a separate
regression of Eq. (1
0
), or run a single cross-sectional pooled regres-
sion of Eq. (1
0
). We tested statistically whether there are any prob-
lems that would advise against the latter approach but found
none.11 Hence, using the following cross-sectional pooled regression
is well justified, and we will refer to it as Model-1:11 While the same factor sensitivities will be obtained using a single cross-sectional
pooled regression or separate regression runs for each section, a key advantage of
pooling cross-sectional data is the ability to leverage the available degrees of freedom
to estimate a larger number of coefficients in a single regression run. But a pooled
regression is feasible only if the sections pooled are homogenous (Gould 2005). If not,
the pooled regression would enforce the same residual variance for all groups,
thereby leading to inadvertent interpretation of the coefficients’ statistical signifi-
cance. Thus, we checked the feasibility of pooling using two statistical tests. We ran
Bartlett’s (1937) M-statistic test and found that the residual variances from separate
subsample regressions (for each sector separately) are not statistically different.
Based on DeShon and Alexander’s (1996) rule of thumb, the ratio between the largest
and smallest residual variance should be below the 1.5 threshold, which is what we
observed. So both tests support the use of a single pooled regression run.CARi;t ¼ aþ b1ð½DRi;t;1Þ þ    þ b6ð½DRi;t;6Þ þ ei ðModel-1Þ
In this expression, CARi,t is the cumulative abnormal return for the
tth GPSC published rating for firm i; a is the model intercept; bs is
the sensitivity of financial services sector s to e-service quality risk;
[DR]i,t,s is the relative change in the tth GPSC rating for firm i if firm i
is in sector s, or 0 otherwise; and ei,t is the error term. Since the [DR]
predictors have zero expected values, the coefficients b1 to b6 are
the free parameters being estimated as the sector-specific sensitiv-
ities to relative changes in e-service quality.
The left columns of Table 3 show the results of a pooled regres-
sion of Model-1, where the mean square errors of the GARCH-
based market model estimated by the event study are used as
weights to minimize the bias (Cochrane 2005). Risk factor sensitiv-
ities are statistically significant for only three sectors: the sensitiv-
ity for discounted brokerages is 12.127 (p < 0.0001), for credit cards
is 20.929 (p < 0.0001), and for mortgages is 4.894 (p < 0.05). The
regression of Model-1 is statistically significant, with an F-value
of 8.83 (p < 0.0001) and an R2 of 6.2%.
We performed several checks to test the robustness of the esti-
mated factor sensitivities. First, we controlled for two firm-specific
characteristics that may influence the magnitude of CARs, to try to
disentangle the primary effects of factor sensitivities from second-
ary effects of firm-specific characteristics.12 The firm-specific char-
acteristics we consider from studies that used them in similar
settings are firm size and firm growth (Chatterjee et al. 2002,
Subramani and Walden 2001). We also ran Model-1.1, which adds
to Model-1 the terms b7(ln[TA]i,t,s) and b8(ln[MBV]i,t,s). Here, b7 and
b8 are regression coefficients, and [TA]i,t,s and [MBV]i,t,s measure firm
size and firm growth as the total assets (in $M) and the market-to-
book value ratio, respectively, for firm i on the tth GPSC rating date
if firm i is in sector s, and 0 otherwise. Both are log-transformed to
avoid having a few extreme observations drive the results (Dekimpe
et al. 1997). We also ran Model-1.2, which uses only the firm-specific
characteristics, based on the terms b7(ln[TA]i,t,s) and b8(ln[MBV]i,t,s).
The results for these models, shown in the right columns of Ta-
ble 3, suggest the following. First, and most importantly, factor
sensitivities in Model-1.1 are comparable to those in Model-1 in
terms of statistical significance and relative magnitudes. Second,12 In line with our primary objective – estimating risk pricing parameters – we do
not consider models including interaction effects.
Table 4
Estimation of risk premium.
Variable Model-2 for estimating risk premium
Parameter estimate t-value Pr > |t|
Intercept 0.974 1.42 0.1569





Prob > F 0.0076
*** Significance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
13 The mortgage sector dealt with this challenge faster: one firm saw improvements
in conversion rates after reducing the loan application form from 16 to 6 steps, and
another that redesigned the mortgage application form specifically for the Interne
saw the time required to fill in the form reduced to 20 min (Hunt and Menon 2006)
M. Benaroch, A. Appari / Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 10 (2011) 534–544 541the positive effects of firm size and firm growth are significant and
may be a direct result of the relatively large stock return from large
firms and firms with rapid growth; yet, the magnitude of coeffi-
cients for these effects is smaller than that for factor sensitivities.
Last, it turns out that the R2s for Model-1 and Model-1.2 almost
add up to the R2 of Model-1.1. This suggests the presence of only
weak interactions between the estimated factor sensitivities and
the firm-specific characteristics used as controls. Overall, these re-
sults indicate the robustness of the estimated factor sensitivities.
In another robustness check, we checked for the possibility that
different sectors react to relative changes in e-service quality rat-
ings over different time windows. We regressed Model-1 while
varying the dependent variable, CAR, for different time windows
ranging from day 2 to day +1. The results (not shown for brevity)
were similar. The same three sectors have statistically significant
factor sensitivities and these sensitivities retain their relative
magnitudes.
To estimate the other risk pricing parameter – the risk premium
per unit exposure to e-service quality risk – we regressed
CAR[2, 1] against the sensitivities from Model-1 (Cochrane
2005). We refer to this regression as Model-2:
CARi;t ¼ aþ kbi;s þ ei;t ðModel-2Þ
In this model, a is the intercept, k is the estimated premium return
per unit exposure to e-service quality risk for firms in all sectors,
and bi,s is the sensitivity for firm i in sector s set to bs. Model-2, how-
ever, is regressed only for firms in those sectors for which sensitiv-
ities came out statistically significant. And, again, to minimize the
estimation bias, we use the mean square errors of the GARCH-based
market model as weights. Table 4 shows the results. The regression
is statistically significant with an F-value of 7.18 (p < 0.01). The risk
premium k is 0.112 and is statistically significant (p < 0.01).
5. Discussion
We proceed to interpret the main risk pricing results of
e-service risk for financial services firms, present implications for
research and practice of these results and the risk pricing approach
presented, and highlight limitations of our work and directions for
future research.
5.1. Main results and interpretation
One of our main empirical results is that the exposure of firms’
B2C e-channels to e-service quality risk is significant. The abnor-
mal returns recorded after the publication of competitive bench-
mark ratings of firms’ e-service quality tell us that some firms
benefit while others suffer as a result of these ratings. On the whole
the mean abnormal returns are somewhat positive, rather than
being zero as if the market reaction to competitive benchmark rat-
ings were following a zero-sum game. One explanation, which is
supported by our data, is that the market also rewards a consistent
overall improvement in firms’ absolute e-service quality ratingsresulting from a continued ongoing investment in IT-related deter-
minants of e-service quality.
Another main result is that the sensitivity of financial services
firms to e-service quality risk varies across sectors. Firms in three
sectors have statistically significant but different sensitivities to
relative changes in e-service quality. Credit card firms have the
largest sensitivity, followed by discount brokerage and by mort-
gage firms. This pattern could be due to the rate at which
e-services have been embraced in these sectors. Among the most
successful early e-commerce businesses were discount brokerage
(Bakos et al. 2005) and online mortgage services (Hunt and Menon
2006). E-services in these sectors grew fast, in part, because of the
fierce competition and aggressive customer acquisition tactics
(Chen and Hitt 2002) from new entrants in the discount brokerage
sector (e.g., eTrade, Datek, AmeriTrade) and the mortgage sector
(e.g., E-Loan, LendingTree, Floan). The credit card and mortgage
sectors faced other growth drivers (Osho 2008). Beginning in
1996, traditional banks pushed to expand their product offerings
and customer base on loan products like credit cards and mort-
gages (Osho 2008). One reason is the erosion of margins in their
liability businesses (savings, money market, etc.) due to the emer-
gence of loan aggregators and Web banks. Another reason is that
Internet companies with strong brands and highly trafficked web-
sites (e.g., Microsoft, Intuit, Yahoo!) began earning fees for gener-
ating mortgage and credit card leads (Hunt and Menon 2006),
and the concern was that they would move into fulfillment and
funding (HFI June 1997). Lastly, there was also a concern that the
Internet will increase the transparency and accelerate concentra-
tion among originators (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 2000). The
end result consequence was that e-service quality became a crucial
determinant of differentiation (Bakos et al. 2005, Chen and Hitt
2002).
By contrast, the other three sectors were not found to have sta-
tistically significant sensitivities to e-service risk. While we cannot
make reliable inferences about these sectors, we can speculate
about the reasons. Banking, insurance and full-service brokerage
services are the largest sectors in the financial services economy
(Bakos et al. 2005). The sheer size of these sectors may be at the
root of the slow growth in their e-services. These sectors encom-
pass many large traditional firms that are better characterized by
their brick-and-mortar side of the business. Their business is inher-
ently about relationships with customers, but at the time, the
e-service channels probably did not represent an acceptable sub-
stitute for the conventional sales channels. Moreover, the potential
for channel conflicts was significant. This factor was at the core of
the full-service brokerages’ slow responses to competition from
the discount brokerages (Bakos et al. 2005). For similar reasons,
major commercial houses including JP Morgan and Chase (when
they were separate firms) and Bankers Trust did not consider mov-
ing into e-services until 1998 (Osho 2008). The insurance sector
faced an additional challenge. While considerable growth occurred
with commodity-type (motor, travel, and home) insurance prod-
ucts, growth in sales of more complex insurance products could
not occur before their lengthy online application process and the
need for an offline verification and approval were reengineered
(Hunt and Menon 2006).13 These factors limited the value of
e-service channels, and made firms in these sectors insensitive to
e-service quality risk.
This explanation is consistent with the extant research and calls
for additional research into the influence of market growth. In the
context of new service and e-service entry, the market growth ratet
.
4 After showing that APT’s tradability assumption is neither valid nor necessary for
on-traded software development projects, Benaroch and Appari (2010) use an
daptation which assumes that all project managers estimate the cost of their
rojects using the same software development costing model (e.g., COCOMO, SLIM
nd SEER). The multi-factor model is adapted to account for firm-specific software
evelopment risk factors and for the premium cost they command as a percentage of
e project cost predicted by the software development costing model. In this sense,
e software development cost estimation model fills the role of a capital market in
overning the project cost premium attributable to risk. This adapted approach has
lso been applied with COCOMO-based data on historical software development
rojects, to derive benchmark risk pricing parameters for several risk factors. The
uthors show that the estimated benchmark risk pricing parameters can be used to
dequately adjust the project cost estimated by COCOMO, up or down, to bring it
oser to the actual project cost. The authors also discuss other uses of risk pricing
formation in the software development context.
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mance (Geyskens et al. 2002, Bowman and Gatignon 1995), as it
can characterize the ease of gaining access to a market (Geyskens
et al. 2002, Ramaswamy et al. 1994). Because rapid market growth
also offers opportunities to broaden e-service operations, it may
positively enhance the overall performance improvement that is
anticipated due to firms’ improvement in their e-service quality
ratings. Future research should verify this explanation by control-
ling for important firm-specific characteristics, for example, the
e-service share of a company’s entire business. This characteristic
probably tends to be low for those sectors for which we did not
find a significant level of sensitivity to e-service quality risk.
A third main result comes out of our robustness test. It shows
the market reaction observed in connection with changes in
e-service quality ratings to be stronger for high growth firms and
for large firms. Two factors may explain the relationship with firm
growth. On the one hand, high growth companies may have great-
er opportunities to capitalize on relative improvements in e-ser-
vice quality ratings due to their earlier IT investments; IT
investments are known to have a strong positive complementari-
ties effect with e-commerce capability that positively contributes
to firm performance (Zhu 2004). On the other hand, high growth
firms experiencing a relative drop in their e-service quality ratings
may be constrained in their ability to make the IT investments nec-
essary to recover their relative e-service quality ratings, because
growth imposes greater cash flow demands (due to the existence
of many high NPV projects) and leaves less funds for IT budgets
(Dewan et al. 1998). Both possibilities suggest that high growth
firms could be more sensitive to e-service quality risk.
It is puzzling, however, that the market reaction to changes
e-service quality risk may be stronger for large firms. Some re-
search has shown that firm size is negatively associated with the
market reaction to e-service launch initiatives (Lin et al. 2007).
Large firms are less exposed to small changes in any single risk fac-
tor, including e-service quality, because they are generally better
diversified in relation to their products, services and sales chan-
nels. Moreover, large firms often have greater established industry
experience, which means a better-established customer base and
brand name as well as lower risk (Gatignon et al. 1990, Geyskens
et al. 2002). By contrast, small firms stand to lose more from expo-
sure to any single risk, including e-service quality risk, although
they may also stand to make inroads into opportunities that larger
firms have already exploited, such as extending their geographic
reach (Alba et al. 1997, Geyskens et al. 2002). Our result goes
against both assertions concerning the impact of firm size, and so
more research is needed to verify and explain this result.
5.2. Implications for practice and research
The implications of our work for practice and research are
numerous. On a practical level, risk pricing information of the kind
we derived can aid managers making decisions on investments in
IT-related determinants of e-service quality. Qualitatively, our re-
sults suggest that small firms, especially in fast-growing industries,
stand to gain more from relative improvements in their e-service
quality ratings. Quantitatively, for credit card companies, return
on IT investment in e-service quality may be twice as high as that
of discount mortgage firms and almost five times that of mortgage
firms, at least for the timeframe our data covers. Repeating our
analysis with recent data may yield relative return on investment
figures that apply today. This information could be of greater value
to large financial services firms with business units operating in
multiple different sectors (credit card, mortgages, brokerage,
etc.), as their investments in IT determinants of e-service quality
could be allocated more optimally across units. Going a step
further, risk pricing information could also benefit firms seekingto manage their relative e-service quality standing according to
benchmark ratings. The premium return on a one-unit change in
relative e-service quality ratings is computed as risk
premium  sensitivity to risk. For example, with the risk premium
of 0.112% we obtained, the premium return for mortgage firms is
0.112  4.894 = 0.548%, for discount brokerage firms is 1.358%,
and for credit card firms is 2.344%. Multiplying the premium return
by the number of outstanding shares of a firm, premium
return  number of shares, can approximate the gain (or loss) in
market value that a firm can expect to see from a one-unit
improvement (or drop) in its relative benchmark e-service quality
ratings. It remains to be seen, however, whether such an approach
also reflects the long-term return on investments in IT-related
determinants of e-service quality.
For research, the implications of our work are twofold. Com-
pared to prior research linking individual IT-related determinants
of e-service quality to firm financial performance (Anderson et al.
2004, Barua et al. 2004, Chen and Hitt 2002, Kotha et al. 2004),
our work goes further by pricing the risk associated with those
determinants. It prices e-service quality risk in terms of the eco-
nomic consequences for a firm if the IT determinants of e-service
quality fall behind or move ahead relative to the competition. This
can open up new ways for IT and marketing research to think
about the economics of investments in e-service quality. Second,
the well-established risk pricing approach we presented could
work equally well in the context of other idiosyncratic IT invest-
ment risks. Security risk, customer adoption risk, and technology
maturity risk are just a few of the IT risks that should be of great
interest to academics and practitioners. As we mentioned earlier,
another adaptation of the approach has been presented and ap-
plied elsewhere for the case of pricing software development risks
(Benaroch and Appari 2010).14 Going beyond the pricing of single IT
investment risks, though, availability of risk pricing information
could open new research directions on fundamental IT investment
management problems, including the valuation and ranking of IT
investments, the economic-based management of IT investment risk,
and the management of IT investment portfolios.
5.3. Limitations and future research
Our study has several limitations which future research ought
to try to resolve. First, as we explained earlier, our data sample
stops at the fourth quarter of 2004 primarily because of a concern
over the objectivity of the third-party ratings posted at that point
in time. As a consequence, to obtain a sufficient size data set we
have included data from two different periods, before and after
the dotcom bust, but we did not control for the possibility of a shift
in stock market returns due to the dotcom bust (Dehning et al.
2004). Considering that our goal is one of estimating risk pricing
parameters, rather than testing hypotheses, adding time dummies
for the before and after dotcom bust periods is not an adequate
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analysis for each subsample separately. Our overall data sample
was insufficiently large to create both subsamples.
A second limitation is the relatively low R2 value that we ob-
tained for the estimation of the risk premium parameter (Table 4).
While this R2 is well within the range of results reported in finan-
cial research dealing with risk pricing (Stickel 1992, Schadewitz
and Kanto 2002), the skeptics may argue that the observed signif-
icance of the coefficients estimated in this regression could be due
to sample size as much as it could be due to the presence of a
meaningful relationship in the data.
Last, our data set does not include the granular components of
Keynote’s GomezPro ratings of e-service quality: the ratings for
website privacy and security, functionality, ease of use, and infor-
mation content and quality. Our empirical analysis cannot tell us
how much each component alone contributes to the sensitivity
of firms to e-service quality risk.
Future research ought to replicate our empirical effort with data
covering a longer period and containing the granular components
of competitive benchmark ratings of e-service quality. Some of
the granular components of e-service quality ratings are in them-
selves recognized as separate IT investment risks (e.g., website
security and availability). Therefore, replicating our empirical effort
for the granular components could lead to more fine-grained and
valuable risk pricing information. Of course, it is possible that none
of these components on its own generates measurable abnormal
market reactions to relative changes in e-service quality ratings.
Additional directions for future research follow from our earlier
discussion of the empirical results. One direction pertains to the
mean abnormal returns computed for announcements of compet-
itive benchmark ratings. These are positive on the whole, whereas
one would expect them to be zero (or close to zero) if the impact of
changes in relative e-service quality ratings followed a zero-sum
game (Table 2). One possibility that we did not mention earlier is
that the market reacts more positively to relative improvements
in e-service quality than it does negatively to relative drops in
e-service quality. This possibility deserves further exploration as
it may have implications for the validity of the linear risk pricing
model that we presented. However, it is worth keeping in mind
that financial research may have considered this possibility in
other contexts and yet it continues using the same linear model.
Another direction worth exploring is how firm-specific charac-
teristics may influence firms’ sensitivity to e-service quality risk.
Neither the sensitivities we have derived empirically nor the
adapted risk pricing model we presented directly consider this is-
sue. Yet, the results of our robustness test indicate the possibility
that, at least, firm growth and firm size may moderate firms’ sensi-
tivity to e-service quality risk. Future research should consider
using a multi-factor version of the risk pricing model we have pre-
sented as one direct way to account for firm-specific characteristics.
In summary, this article is the first to present a risk pricing ap-
proach in the IT investment risk context and its application to
e-service quality risk. Still, it ought to been seen as only a first step
in a journey towards a better understanding of the challenges in-
volved in pricing IT investment risk, as well as a fuller appreciation
of the theoretical and practical value of risk pricing information.
We are confident that the ideas and results that we have presented
will inspire and encourage researchers to join this journey and pur-
sue some of the research directions we have touched upon.
Acknowledgments
Michel Benaroch thanks the Robert H. Brethen Institute for
Operations Research of the Whitman School of Management at
Syracuse University for partial funding.References
American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI). Drop in e-commerce customer
satisfaction ends three-year climb. Watershed Publishing, Thetford, VT.
<www.marketingvox.com/drop-in-e-commerce-customer-satisfaction-ends-
three-year-climb-043232> (February 17, 2009).
Alba, J., Lynch, J., Weitz, B., Janiszewski, C., Lutz, R., Sawyer, A., and Wood, S.
Interactive home shopping: Consumer, retailer, and manufacturer incentives to
participate in electronic marketplaces. Journal of Marketing, 61, 3, 1997, 38–53.
Al-Hawari, M. The effect of automated service quality on bank financial
performance and the mediating role of customer retention. Journal of
Financial Services Marketing, 10, 3, 2006, 228–243.
Al-Hawari, M., and Ward, T. The effect of automated service quality on Australian
banks’ financial performance and the mediating role of customer satisfaction.
Marketing Intelligence and Planning, 24, 2, 2006, 127–147.
Anderson, R. E., and Srinivasan, S. S. E-satisfaction and e-loyalty: A contingency
framework. Psychology and Marketing, 20, 2, 2003, 123–138.
Anderson, E. W., Fornell, C., and Mazvancheryl, S. K. Customer satisfaction and
shareholder value. Journal of Marketing, 68, 2004, 172–185.
Bai, B., Law, R., and Wen, I. The impact of website quality on customer satisfaction
and purchase intentions: Evidence from Chinese online visitors. International
Journal of Hospitality Management, 27, 3, 2008, 391–402.
Bakos, Y., Lucas, H. C., Jr., Oh, W., Simon, G., Viswanathan, S., and Weber, B. W. The
impact of e-commerce on competition in the retail brokerage industry.
Information Systems Research, 16, 4, 2005, 352–371.
Barua, A., Konana, P., Whinston, A. B., and Yin, F. An empirical investigation of net-
enabled business value. MIS Quarterly, 28, 4, 2004, 585–620.
Bartlett, M. S. Properties of sufficiency and statistical tests. Proceedings of the Royal
Society, A160, 1937, 268–282.
Bauer, H. H., Hammerschmidt, M., and Falk, T. Measuring the quality of e-banking
portals. International Journal of Bank Marketing, 23, 2, 2005, 153–175.
Benaroch, M., and Appari, A. Financial pricing of software development risk factors.
IEEE Software, 27, 5, 2010, 65–73.
Benaroch, M., and Kauffman, R. J. A case for using real option pricing analysis to
evaluate information technology investments. Information Systems Research, 10,
1, 1999, 70–86.
Binder, J. J. The event study methodology since 1969. Review of Quantitative Finance
and Accounting, 11, 2, 1998, 111–137.
Boulding, W., Kalra, A., Staelin, R., and Zeithaml, V. A. A dynamic process model of
service quality: From expectations to behavioral intention. Journal of Marketing
Research, 30, 1, 1993, 7–26.
Bowman, D., and Gatignon, H. Determinants of competitor response time to a new
product introduction. Journal of Marketing Research, 32, 1, 1995, 42–53.
Brechbühl, H. Web 2.0 and the Corporation: A thought Leadership Roundtable on
Digital Strategies. Glassmeyer/McNamee Center for Digital Strategies, Tuck
School of Business, Dartmouth College, 2007.
Brown, S. J., and Warner, J. B. Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies.
Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 1, 1985, 3–31.
Campbell, J. Y., Lo, A. W., and MacKinlay, A. C. The Econometrics of Financial Markets.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1997.
Carpenter, T. Analysis from Watchfire GomezPro: Better customer experience,
questionable online security. Insurance and Technology. <www.
insurancetech.com> (August 3, 2005).
Chatterjee, D., Pacini, C., and Sambamurthy, V. The shareholder-wealth and trading
volume effects of information technology infrastructure investments. Journal of
Management Information Systems, 19, 2, 2002, 7–42.
Chen, P., and Hitt, L. Measuring switching costs and the determinants of customer
retention in Internet enabled businesses: A study of online brokerage industry.
Information Systems Research, 13, 3, 2002, 255–274.
Cheng, J. M. S., Tsao, S. M., Tsai, W. H., and Tu, H. H. J. Will e-channel additions
increase the financial performance of the firm? The evidence from Taiwan.
Industrial Marketing Management, 36, 1, 2007, 50–57.
Citigroup Inc. Citi Cards Web site ranked #1 by Watchfire GomezPro. Press Release,
New York, NY. <www.citigroup.com/citigroup/press/2004/040322a.htm>
(March 22, 2004).
Cochrane, J. H. Asset Pricing. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2005.
Collier, J. E., and Bienstock, C. C. Measuring service quality in e-retailing. Journal of
Service Research, 8, 3, 2006, 260–275.
Corhay, A., and Rad, T. A. Conditional heteroskedascticity adjusted market model
and an event study. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 36, 4,
1996.
Cowan Research. Eventus version 8.0: Software for event studies and CRSP data
retrieval. Ames, IA. <www.eventstudy.com> (January 2007).
Dehning, B., Richardson, V. J., Urbaczewski, A., and Wells, J. D. Reexamining the
value relevance of e-commerce initiatives. Journal of Management Information
Systems, 21, 1, 2004, 55–82.
Dekimpe, M. G., Jan-Benedict, E. M. S., Martin, M., and Piet, V. A. Decline and
variability in brand loyalty. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 14, 5,
1997, 405–420.
DeShon, R. P., and Alexander, R. A. Alternative procedures for testing regression
slope homogeneity when group error variances are unequal. Psychological
Methods, 1, 3, 1996, 261–277.
Devaraj, S., Fan, M., and Kohli, R. Antecedents of B2C channel satisfaction and
preference: Validating e-commerce metric. Information Systems Research, 13, 3,
2002, 316–333.
544 M. Benaroch, A. Appari / Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 10 (2011) 534–544Dewan, S., Michael, S. C., and Min, C. Firm characteristics and investments in
information technology: Scale and scope effects. Information Systems Research,
9, 3, 1998, 219–232.
Dybvig, P. H., and Ross, S. A. Yes, the APT is testable. Journal of Finance, 40, 4, 1985,
1173–1188.
Edvardsson, B., Johnson, M., and Gustafssou, A. The effect of satisfaction and loyalty
on profit and growth: Product versus services. Total Quality Management, 11, 7,
2000, 917–927.
Elton, J. E., and Gruber, M. J. Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis. John
Wiley and Sons, New York, NY, 1995.
Evans, P., and Wurster, T. Strategy and the new economics of information. Harvard
Business Review, 75, 6, 1997, 71–82.
Fox, S. Online banking jumps 47% in 2 years. Pew Internet and American Life Project,
Washington, DC, 2005. <www.pewInternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_Banking_
2005.pdf>.
Gatignon, H., Weitz, B., and Bansal, P. Brand introduction strategies and competitive
environments. Journal of Marketing Research, 27, 4, 1990, 390–401.
Geyskens, I., Gielens, K., and Dekimpe, M. G. The market valuation of Internet
channel additions. Journal of Marketing, 66, 2, 2002, 102–119.
Gould, W. Pooling data and performing Chow tests in linear regression StataCorp,
College Station, TX. <www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/awreg.html> (August
2005).
Hunt, R., and Menon, R. Automate and engage to fulfill the true potential of the
Internet. White paper, Financial Insights #CG40N, IDG, Boston, MA.
<www.adobe.com/financial/pdfs/idc_wp.pdf> (October 2006).
Huntington.com. Huntington moves up three places in Keynote WebExcellence
Banker Scorecard; one of foremost industry measurements. M2 Presswire.
<www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-32500079_ITM> (July 30,
2007).
Kotha, S., Rajagopal, S., and Venkatachalam, M. The role of online buying experience
as a competitive advantage: Evidence from third party ratings for e-commerce
firms. Journal of Business, 77, 2, 2004, S109–S133.
Lee, G. G., and Lin, H. F. Customer perceptions of e-service quality in online
shopping. International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management, 33, 2,
2005, 161–176.
Lin, J. S. C., Jang, W. Y., and Chen, K. J. Assessing the market valuation of e-service
initiatives. International Journal of Service Industry Management, 18, 3, 2007,
224–245.
Malkiel, B. A Random Walk Down Wall Street. W.W. Norton, New York, NY, 1999.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter. The Internet mortgage report II: Focus on fulfillment.
Industry report, New York, NY, February 10, 2000.
Moutinho, L., and Smith, A. Modelling bank customer satisfaction through
mediation of attitudes toward human and automated banking. International
Journal of Bank Marketing, 18, 3, 2000, 124–134.
Osho, G. S. How technology is breaking traditional barriers in the banking industry:
Evidence from financial management perspective. European Journal of
Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences, 11, 2008, 15–21.
Parasuraman, A., Zeithaml, V. A., and Malhotra, A. E-S-QUAL: A multiple-item scale
for assessing electronic service quality. Journal of Service Research, 7, 3, 2005,
213–234.Ramaswamy, V., Gatignon, H., and Reibstein, D. J. Competitive marketing behavior
in industrial markets. Journal of Marketing, 58, 2, 1994, 45–55.
Ranaweera, C., and Neely, A. Some moderating effects on the service quality–
customer retention link. International Journal of Operation and Production
Management, 23, 2, 2003, 230–245.
Reichheld, F. K., and Kenny, D. W. The hidden advantages of customer retention.
Journal of Retail Banking, 12, 4, 1990, 19–32.
Rowley, J. An analysis of the e-service literature: Towards a research agenda.
Internet Research, 16, 3, 2006, 339–359.
Rust, R. T., and Miu, C. What academic research tells us about service.
Communications of the ACM, 49, 7, 2006, 49–54.
Santos, J. E-service quality: A model of virtual service quality dimensions. Managing
Service Quality, 13, 3, 2003, 233–246.
Sawhney, M., and Zabin, J. The Seven Steps to Nirvana: Strategic Insights into e-
Business Transformation. McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 2001.
Schadewitz, H. J., and Kanto, A. J. The impact of disclosure on the market response to
reported earnings. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 18, 4, 2002, 521–542.
Stickel, S. E. Reputation and performance among security analysts. Journal of
Finance, 47, 5, 1992, 1811–1836.
Subramani, M., and Walden, E. The impact of e-commerce announcements on the
market value of firms. Information Systems Research, 12, 2, 2001, 135–154.
Tang, G. Y. N. How efficient is naïve portfolio diversification? An educational note.
Omega, 32, 2004, 155–160.
Thompson, R. Conditioning the return-generating process on firm-specific events: A
discussion of event study methods. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
20, 2, 1985, 151–168.
Wolfinbarger, M., and Gilly, M. C. eTailQ: Dimensionalizing, measuring and
predicting etail quality. Journal of Retailing, 79, 3, 2003, 183–198.
Wright, S.A., and Dawson, S. Watchfire GómezPro announces Q4 2004 full service
brokerage scorecard results and launches new methodology. Watchfire.
<www.watchfire.com> (November 15, 2004).
Wu, F., Mahajan, V., and Balasubramanian, S. An analysis of e-business adoption and
its impact on business performance. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,
31, 4, 2003, 425–447.
Yoo, B., and Donthu, N. Developing a scale to measure perceived quality of an
Internet shopping site. Quarterly Journal of Electronic Commerce, 2, 1, 2001, 31–
46.
Zeithaml, V., Berry, L., and Parasuraman, A. The behavioral consequences of service
quality. Journal of Marketing, 60, 1996, 31–46.
Zeithaml, V. A., Parasuraman, A., and Malhotra, A. Service quality delivery through
web sites: A critical review of extant knowledge. Journal of the Academy of
Marketing Science, 30, 4, 2002, 362–375.
Zhu, K. The complementarity of information technology infrastructure and e-
commerce capability: A resource-based assessment of their business value.
Journal of Management Information Systems, 21, 1, 2004, 167–202.
Zhu, F. W., Jr., and Chen, I. IT-based services and service quality in consumer
banking. International Journal of Service Industry Management, 13, 1, 2002, 69–
90.
